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Standing at The Crossroads: An 
Empirical Analysis of No-Fault 
Automobile Insurance and Its 
Potential Consequences 
Introduction 
Continuing concern over the social 
and economic problems caused by in-
creasing insurance premiums and esca-
lating awards has forced legislators to 
consider alternatives within the auto-
motive liability field. This movement has 
led to proposals and laws focused on 
changing the legal system's responses to 
automobile insurance cases. In Mary-
land, one might say the legislators are 
"standin' at the crossroad"! debating 
which avenue to take. Proposed changes 
have concentrated primarily on modify-
ing negligence liability instead of liabil-
ity coverage. Unfortunately, many pro-
posed approaches realign fault, which is 
the primary insurance mechanism. 
Today, insurance companies, trial law-
yers, editorial writers, consumer orga-
nizations, and politicians fill periodicals 
with charges and counter-charges over 
whether there is a litigation explosion 
or a liability crisis in the automobile 
insurance industry and who is to blame.2 
The controversy manifests itself in a 
mandate for various reforms of the tradi-
tional tort system and in turn encour-
ages persistent efforts to enact a form of 
no-fault insurance.3 In Pennsylvania, no-
fault insurance was repealed in 1984,4 
yet no-fault advocates are trying to 
implement it again.5 In Maryland, the 
efforts towards no-fault have met resis-
tance from the Maryland Bar Association 
and the Maryland Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion.6 Recently, the Medical and Chirug-
10-The Law Forum/21.2 
for Maryland 
by William P. Atkins 
ical Society of Maryland has fought pro-
posed no-fault legislation that statutorily 
dictates the cost of medical care pro-
vided to an accident victim.7 
Proponents argue that a no-fault pol-
icy keeps insurance premiums lower 
than traditional liability insurance, de-
creases litigation, reduces delays in the 
payment of claims, and increases vic-
tims' benefits. This article will analyze 
these four claims in light of the empiri-
cal evidence produced by current and 
past no-fault systems. 
Concluding with a revelation of prof-
itability, this article will dispel the insur-
ance industry's defense that they are 
currently losing money and therefore 
must revert to a no-fault system. How-
ever, in order to understand no-fault 
policies, it is necessary to first look 
briefly at the traditional tort system and 
the current insurance industry environ-
ment. 
The Traditional Tort System 
Automobile negligence laws were de-
veloped to compensate the victims of 
negligent motorists and deter irrespon-
sible driving behavior.8 Automobile in-
surance was designed to protect the 
negligent motorist from insolvency in 
the event that liability was imposed on 
him. Insurance not only attempts to 
compensate victims for their injuries, 
but also to allocate the risks associated 
with operating automobil~s over a large 
group and thereby limits the cost which 
may fall upon anyone individual.9 
It is a basic premise that drivers who 
injure must compensate their victims. If 
the negligent driver's insurance com-
pany fails to provide adequate compen-
sation, the injured party can file civil suit 
against the negligent driver. Adequate 
compensation can include monetary 
awards for pain and suffering, disability, 
disfigurement, economic loss, or death 
caused by the negligence. 1O Economic 
loss is typically comprised of medical 
bills, lost income, and other financial 
reparations. 
In order to prevail in court, the victim 
must prove who was at fault, the nature 
and extent of any injuries suffered, and 
whether the negligent party actually 
caused the injuries.!! Having determined 
a negligent act was committed, the 
court or jury then makes an award to the 
injured party based upon the facts pre-
sented. In this way, the traditional tort 
system protects innocent victims of all 
ages, income levels, and backgrounds by 
allowing the factfinder, instead of an 
insurance company, to decide an ap-
propriate amount of compensation. 
It has become increasingly popular 
over the past few decades to view victim 
compensation as the central purpose of 
tort law, while disregarding the deter-
rent purpose.J 2 This view has particu-
larly affected courts' judgments,n and 
one can appreciate why they find it 
appealing. Prior to the enlightened age 
of liability insurance, a verdict for dam-
ages was limited to a man's wealth. 
Today, however, judges and juries are 
typically faced with a solitary victim and 
a defendant backed by an insurance 
company. These judges and juries real-
ize that the insurance system was de-
signed to absorb and widely distribute 
the loss of an individual plaintiff. There-
fore, given the general compassion for 
accident victims, the superior loss-
minimizing abilities of insurance com-
panies, and the activism of today's judi-
ciary, tort law has become a system with 
a preference for awarding compensa-
tion to meet a presumed need.14 Yet, 
deterrence is the quiet sister that shad-
ows this compensation. 
The Insurance Industry Today 
With more than 2.5 million cars cur-
rently registered in Maryland, automo-
bile accidents are inevitable. One study 
estimated that a driver makes 200 obser-
vations per mile, twenty decisions per 
mile, and one error every two miles. 15 
These errors result in a near collision 
once every 500 miles, a collision once 
every 61,000 miles, a personal injury 
once every 430,000 miles, and a fatal 
accident once every 16 million miles.16 
An oligopoly is typically defined as a 
form of monopoly in which the effective 
control of the market is exercised by a 
limited number of sellers. To gain market 
share in an oligolopolistic industry, a 
supplier might consider lowering his 
prices. However, price cuts would re-
duce the comfortable profit margin, 
potentially start a price war, and invoke 
the vengence of the other suppliers. 
In Maryland, the automobile insurance 
market is essentially an oligopoly.J7 In 
1987, more than 70% of all automobile 
policies sold in Maryland were written 
by 3% of the 250 licensed companies.18 
The top four companies (State Farm, 
Allstate, Nationwide, and Geico) ac-
counted for more than 54% of all private-
passenger auto liability coverage in Mary-
land for 1989.19 In that same year, the 
top eight companies enjoyed a com-
bined market share of 71 % in Mary-
and.20 
Monopolistic practices and non-
competiveness such as this prompted 
Congress to pass antitrust laws in the 
beginning of this century. At the time 
these laws were enacted, the insurance 
industry was lobbying to be regulated by 
the federal government and thereby 
immune from antitrust laws. Until 1944, 
the insurance industry was mostly 
exempt from the auspices of the anti-
trust laws. In that year, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that insurance was 
interstate commerce and therefore sub-
ject to federal antitrust laWS.21 
Within one year, inSurance compan-
ies had cajoled congress into passing the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.22 The act makes 
antitrust legislation "applicable to the 
business of insurance [only] to the ex-
tent that such business is not regulated 
by state laws."23 Because insurance reg-
ulation was prevalent in every state, 
Congress had put insurance back under 
the antitrust exemption umbrella, safe 
from competition. 
In 1990, the U.S. House of Rep res en-
tatives Judiciary Committee voted to ef-
fectively repeal the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act24 and handed the industry its first 
defeat after forty-five years of maintain-
ing the exemption. Additional Congres-
sional action is expected. This move-
ment from a legislatively permitted 
oligopoly towards a competitive market 
is one that should initiate price reforms 
that will inevitably benefit the con-
sumer.25 
" .. . 70% of all 
automobile policies 
sold in Maryland were 
written by 3 % of the 
250 licensed companies. " 
Theory of No-Fault Insurance 
The concept of no-fault automobile 
insurance was first introduced in the 
United States in 1932 by a group of 
social scientists from Columbia Univer-
sity.26 Having fallen into academic ob-
scurity, it was resurrected in 1965 with 
the publication of a no-fault plan 
authored by current Federal Judge 
Robert E. Keeton (D. Mass.) and Univer-
sity of Virginia law professor Jeffrey 
O'Connell.27 In their paper, Keeton and 
O'Connell proposed that automobile in-
surance reform was necessary for four 
reasons. First, they claimed that the cur-
rent insurance system frequently pro-
duced unfair out-of-court settlements.28 
In most instances, the victim was com-
pensated for much less than his out of 
pocket expenses.29 Second, the system 
was "cumbersome and slow," with pro-
tracted litigation causing long delays in 
the compensation of victims.3D Third, 
the system was extremely wasteful in 
that less than 50% of all premiums paid 
ever reached the victims.31 Last, the sys-
. tern encouraged dishonesty. Keeton and 
O'Connell believed that this dishonesty 
was due to parties overstating their 
claims or defenses in order to be com-
pensated for their actual losses.32 The 
Keeton and O'Connell no-fault insurance 
plan was designed to alleviate these 
problems by establishing a minimum 
dollar limit or threshold for instituting 
claims, as well as by prOviding prompt 
payment of medical expenses up to a 
moderate limit, regardless of fault. 33 
Unlike the traditional approach, a 
driver involved in an accident under a 
purely no-fault system would tum to his 
own insurance company for all damages 
regardless of fault or liability. Thus, in 
theory, no-fault insurance provides 
compensation to all those involved in an 
accident. In the vast majority of cases, 
however, compensation is limited to 
purely economic losses such as medical 
expenses, lost income, and does not in-
clude monetary awards for pain and 
suffering. 
The injured party is only allowed to 
plead their case in court when the dam-
ages reach a certain amount or thresh-
old. Thus, an understanding of thresh-
olds is crucial to the concept of no-fault· 
insurance, for they are the barriers that 
prevent litigation and therefore lower 
premiums. Access to the civil justice sys-
tem under a no-fault insurance policy is 
typically permitted only when the com-
pensation surpasses a verbal threshold, 
monetary amount, or a combination of 
both. 
A verbal, sometimes called "defini-
tional," threshold specifies the type of 
injury for which one can sue.34 The type 
of injury usually specified is either a 
permanent one, one that results in death, 
or one which causes long term disability 
or disfigurement. A monetary, some-
times called "medical," threshold is 
crossed when the cost of medical treat-
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ment exceeds a specified amount for 
medical expenses.35 Both of the verbal 
and medical thresholds can be com-
bined in a variety of ways to suit a legisla-
tor's compensatory requirements. 
The first no-fault law was enacted in 
Massachusetts on January 1, 1971, six 
years after the Keeton and O'Connell 
plan was published.36 Within five years, 
seventeen states had adopted it. Never-
theless, this trend reversed itself just as 
quickly. Exasperated with spiraling 
premiums and increasing litigation, a 
number of states repeated their no-fault 
laws: Nevada in 1979,37 Pennsylvania in 
1984,38 North Dakota39 and Utah in 
1985,40 the District of Columbia in 
1988,41 and Georgia in 1991.42 
Currently, 36 states utilize a form of 
the traditional tort system whereas only 
14 continue to use no-fault.43 Nine of 
these traditional tort states, employ 
"add-on" no-fault insurance. "Add-on" is 
an option one can purchase and it pro-
vides compensation if the insured is hit 
by a no-fault insurance holder. Addi-
tionally, the "add-on" feature typically 
does not preclude litigation. "Add-on" 
provides a victim with compensation 
from his own insurance company in the 
event he is hit by a no-fault driver. 
Referred to as Personal Injury Protec-
tion (PIP) in Maryland, it provides up to 
S 1 0,000 in medical expenses and lost 
wages.44 Before 1989, PIP was a manda-
tory feature of Marylanders auto insur-
ance; it is now optiona1.45 It is interest-
ing to note that while the premium for 
PIP and bodily injury coverage in tradi-
tional tort states increased 60%,46 no-
fault states suffered increases such as 
108% in Michigan and 206% in Pennsyl-
vania.47 On average, no-fault premiums 
are 20% higher than those found in a 
traditional tort system.48 
The Theory of Consumer's Choice 
No-Fault Insurance 
Out of the mirror house of no-fault 
insurance came an idea sponsored by 
the insurance industry and currently 
being touted in Maryland as the solution 
to our insurance crisis.49 Labeled as con-
sumer's choice no-fault, this new con-
cept allows policyholders to choose 
between traditional tort and no-fault 
coverage. "Choice" no-fault insurance 
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was created to give consumers a choice. 
Unfortunately, the only choice is which 
policy. 
For example, the driver who elects to 
maintain traditional tort coverage under 
a "choice" plan is put at a severe disad-
vantage when recovering from an acci-
dent caused by a no-fault driver. Unless 
he surpasses the legislatively mandated 
threshold, the innocent traditional tort 
driver is precluded from suing the neg-
ligent no-fault driver, thereby losing his 
right to have a court determine fair 
compensation for his injuries.5o Thus, 
the traditional tort policyholder must 
file for benefits with his own insurance 
company. However, these benefits are 
limited to the amount of coverage spe-
cifically purchased by the traditional 
tort policyholder. 
UOn average, no-fault 
premiums are 
20% higher. . ." 
An exception recognized by advo-
cates of consumer's choice provides 
that intoxicated no-fault drivers would 
remain accountable for their conduct 
and continue to be subject to judicially-
determined liability. Unspecified in the 
exemption, however, is whether a driver 
must first be charged and convicted 
with drunk driving before a civil suit is 
allowed. Due to a number of factors, 
including the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof, many drivers are 
never charged with drunk driving, or 
plead guilty to lesser charges. Further-
more, even if a driver is charged and 
convicted with drunk driving, the insur-
ance company that carries his policy typ-
ically denies liability coverage under no-
fault insurance because the driver was 
convicted. Therefore, the "drunk" ex-
ception typically exposes the convicted 
no-fault driver to full liability while ne-
glecting to provide defense counsel, 
reparations, or a damage award. Thus, 
the traditional tort victim is left with the 
convicted drunk driver's individual and 
personal liability. 
The Reality of No-Fault 
Advocates for no-fault insurance claim 
that their system will lower insurance 
premiums, decrease litigation, reduce 
delays in the payment of claims, and 
increase victims' benefits. However, an 
empirical look at the experiences of 
states that enacted no-fault insurance 
tells a different tale. In a no-fault insur-
ance environment, premiums climb 
after an introductory drop, litigation 
increases as the victim is forced to sue 
his own insurance company as well as 
the negligent driver, and a victim's bene-
fits, decreased through medical com-
promises, prove that faster benefits are 
a fallacy. 
Higher Premiums 
No-fault supporters guarantee lower 
premiums and yet, two no-fault states 
head the highest premiums list.51 From 
1975 to 1982, automobile insurance 
premiums in no-fault New Jersey in-
creased by 162%.52 In Pennsylvania and 
Michigan, no-fault states with benefits 
comparable to New Jersey, premiums 
increased by 206% and 108%, re-
spectively.53 In the same period, premi-
ums in traditional tort states such as 
California, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, 
rose between 47% and 74%.54 Overall, 
the nationwide premium in no-fault 
states averaged 20% higher than in those 
states maintaining traditional tort sys-
tems. 55 Nevada, Pennsylvania, North 
Dakota, Utah, and the District of Colum-
bia repealed their no-fault laws after 
years of increasing auto insurance pre-
miums.56 Premiums actually dropped 
50% after the repeal took effect in 
Nevada.57 
No-fault advocates claim that the dis-
parity between the statewide average 
and city residents' premiums is drasti-
cally reduced if not completely negated. 
Contrary to this claim, urban residents 
have experienced the highest rates ever 
under no-fault. While Baltimore City 
residents pay 51 % more than Maryland's 
statewide average, the disparity is even 
greater in no-fault states.58 Under no-
fault systems, Detroit residents pay 74% 
more than the Michigan average,59 Miami 
residents pay 116% more than the Flor-
ida statewide average,60 and Phila-
delphia residents pay 250% more than 
the Pennsylvania average.61 
Another disadvantage of no-fault insur-
ance is the elimination of safe driver 
discounts. In traditional tort states, safe 
drivers can often obtain substantial dis-
counts.62 No-fault not only eliminates 
the safe driver concept, but discrimi-
nates against safe drivers by forcing 
them to pay higher premiums in order 
to subsidize those drivers who pose 
greater risks. A comparison of the tradi-
tional tort premiums in Baltimore to no-
fault rates in Detroit shows this disparity 
with a Baltimore City teenager paying 
nearly the same amount as a 45 year old 
married male in Detroit.63 
Baltimore Detroit Difference 
Married Male, 
age 45 $1,271 $2,915 +129% 
Single Male, 
age 18 S2,851 S2,815 -1.3% 
A telling comparison of markets 
involves Michigan with no-fault and its 
neighbor, Ohio, with a traditional tort 
system. These two markets are remark-
ably similar in population, size, urban to 
rural ratio, and number of automobile 
registrations.64 However, Michigan, with 
no-fault, has the nineteenth highest 
average annual auto premiums in the 
United States.65 Ranked forty-second, 
Ohio has one of the ten lowest average 
premiums in the country. The inflated 
premiums of Michigan residentsprompt-
ed then Governor James Blanchard to 
state the following: "Our studies show 
the rates are too high. We can cut the 
rates for mandatory auto insurance cov-
erage by 20% and freeze them without 
reducing benefits or damaging the insur-
ance industry."66 This disparity in pre-
miums indicates that a similarly situated 
traditional tort system is substantially 
less expensive than a no-fault system. 
Contrary to the assertions of its advo-
cates, empirical data shows that premi-
ums actually increased in states that 
adopted a no-fault system. Having suf-
fered through these premium increases, 
many states have repealed no-fault and 
seen their premiums drop. Furthermore, 
urban drivers can look forward to dras-
tic increases in their premiums under a 
no-fault system, while good drivers will 
be forced to subsidize the higher risk 
drivers. Moreover, a comparison of pre-
miums between a no-fault and tradi-
tional tort state revealed a disparity in 
premiums (nineteenth and forty-
second) that can only be based on their 
differing insurance systems. This tangi-
ble evidence confirms that no-fault advo-
cates promises of lower premiums are a 
fallacy. 
Increased Litigation 
In order to lower premiums, no-fault 
requires a victim to surrender all legal 
claims arising from an accident which 
do not surpass a proscribed threshold.67 
In so doing, no-fault advocates propose 
that litigation is reduced. However, 
those victims who do not surpass the 
threshold are not precluded from suing 
their own insurance company in order 
to obtain adequate benefits. 
U[DJata shows that 
premiums actually 
increase in states that 
have a no-fault system." 
Accordingly, a 1986 study found that 
these "first party" suits added to the 
existing pool of emasculated claims in 
no-fault states and actually helped 
create a substantial rise in the number of 
lawsuits.68 The result is not surprising in 
light of the typical verbal threshold pro-
visions of no-fault legislation. Again, a 
verbal threshold specifies the type of 
injury for which one can sue.69 The Dis-
trict of Columbia's 1985 amendment to 
their existing no-fault statute (since 
repealed in 1988) allowed suit where: 
[ t ] he injury directly results in sub-
stantial permanent scarring or dis-
figurement, substantial and medi-
cally demonstrable permanent im-
pairment which has Significantly 
affected the ability of the victim to 
perform his or her professional 
activities or usual and customary 
daily activities, or a medically dem-
onstrable impairment that pre-
vents the victim from performing 
all or substantially all of the mate-
rial acts and duties that constitute 
his or her usual customary daily 
activities for more than 180 con-
tinuous days.70 
Similarly Michigan law prohibits the 
initiation of an automobile negligence 
suit unless the accident causes death, 
serious impairment of a bodily function, 
serious disfigurement, or the damages 
exceed the prescribed limit for eco-
nomic 10ss.7' The economic hurdle for 
damages required before a suit may be 
initiated, is set at 85% of earnings lost by 
the victim up to $1,250 per month.72 
This hybrid threshold forced Michigan 
victims to file more than 6,000, "first 
party" cases against their own insurance 
companies in order to secure adequate 
compensation for medical bills as well 
as lost wages. Unfortunately, the increase 
in litigation is indicative of serious de-
creases in benefits provided to innocent 
victims. As we will see, insurance carri-
ers in Michigan routinely terminated 
benefits, and policyholders, conse-
quently, could not afford to pay for 
needed physical or occupational ther-
apy.73 Furthermore, the insurance pro-
viders required many of their policy-
holders to be examined by "cut-off' 
physicians, hired by the insurance com-
panies to determine whether to end the 
victim's medical treatment. 
In a monetary threshold system, the 
medical expenses of an accident victim 
must surpass a legislated amount in 
order to allow litigation. Although this 
seems like a simple and uniform scheme, 
the question of where to set the mone-
tary hurdle and the effects thereof have 
been the subject of much debateJ4 A 
1982 study revealed that 24% ofall insur-
ance claims were barred from tort re-
covery in five states with a $500 thresh-
01d,75 and an average of 35% of all 
insurance claims were barred in three 
states which implemented a $1,000 
threshold.76 
Yet, no-fault does not decrease litiga-
tion. In reality, it has initiated entirely 
new bodies of law. Furthermore, mone-
tary threshold states allow access to the 
litigation process for a majority of the 
automobile negligence suits anyway. 
These two avenues combine to increase 
the current overloaded docket instead 
of decreasing it. 
Faster Benefits 
The contention that victims collect 
benefits more quickly under no-fault 
insurance is equally misleading. In a no-
fault state, benefits are paid out more 
quickly. No-fault proponents point to 
Michigan's implementation and subse-
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quent data showing that a larger percen-
tage of claims were paid out within the 
first fifteen months after they were filed. 
However, these statistics are misleading. 
Although a higher percentage might be 
paid out in the first fifteen months under 
no-fault, a smaller amount is paid overall. 
While concededly longer in a tradi-
tional tort state, the average time spent 
in recovering benefits is caused by the 
victim's need for full compensation and 
continued health care.77 Typically, vic-
tims of an accident in a traditional tort 
state must determine the long term 
impact of their injury before filing suit 
because only then can they fully recover 
for their injuries, pain and suffering, and 
economic losses. The complete impact 
an accident has on a victim's life is 
inconcievable immediately after the inci-
dent. Thus, while the traditional tort 
benefits might be slower, they do not 
run the risk of short changing victims. 
Compromises In Medical Care 
Historically, insurance companies 
have used three avenues to compromise 
care and recovery with no-fault: re-
stricted medical fees, "cut-off" examina-
tions, and review of medical treatment.78 
By reducing the amount of benefits for 
medical care, insurance companies re-
duce their payout and increase profits at 
the expense of their injured policy-
holders. 
Proposals have been made to limit 
fees to the same schedules that the state 
uses for worker's compensation or to 
the schedule of benefits that a physician 
receives if a patient has no insurance.79 
Because the better and more experi-
enced physicians refuse to work for 
these reduced fees, accident victims will 
be forced to turn to the few remaining, 
and less qualified, doctors. 
Typically, no-fault insurance incorpo-
rates a "cut-off' physician. These doc-
tors are employed by the insurance 
company and determine whether the 
policyholder is no longer in need of 
medical care. The objective is to termi-
nate unwarranted and unjustified medi-
cal care. Often these examinations lead 
to the termination of justified benefits 
such as physical and occupational ther-
apy, rehabilitation, wage replacement 
and other medical care. Thus, this finan-
cially motivated "cutting off" could 
potentially result in continued pain, dis-
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ability, or permanent injury for the acci-
dent victim. 
In addition to "cut off' physicians, no-
fault insurance policies often utilize 
wording that allows a medical review. 
With medical review, the insurance com-
pany maintains the right to examine a 
policyholder's medical care and decide 
whether all of the treatments are neces-
sary. The scrutinized benefits include 
physical and occupational therapy as 
well as rehabilitation. If treatments are 
found to be "unnecessary," the policy-
holder'S insurance company may refuse 
to pay for them. 
UAbolishing fault 
eliminates deterrence and 
undermines the concept 
of accountability . .. " 
These various avenues are used in no-
fault states to reduce the benefits to 
policyholders and, consequently, have 
resulted in a flood of lawsuits. Despite 
the obvious disadvantages, proponents 
of no-fault and consumer's choice no-
fault still believe their system is better 
than the traditional tort system. In real-
ity, no-fault insurance helps further min-
imize medical costs to the insurance 
companies, while simultaneouslyreduc-
ing the advantages to the consumers. 
Deterrence Is No Longer A Factor 
Although insurance protection shifts 
the direct economic burden of an acci-
dent from the tortfeasor to the insur-
ance company, the compensation funds 
ultimately come from the insured. In 
turn, the claims paid out raise policy-
holders' premium rates, individually and 
collectively. Three alternatives combine 
to deter the public from driving negli-
gently: increased insurance or premium 
cost, the threat of cancellation or non-
renewal of coverage, and safety mea-
sures as a condition of coverage. so 
Abolishing fault eliminates deterrence 
and undermines the concept of account-
ability implicit in tort law. Negligent, 
reckless, or even drunk drivers are 
treated equally in terms of the coverage 
they receive after causing an accident. 
Suppose a habitually negligent driver 
causes injuries in four separate colli-
sions. Under no-fault, the driver pays 
nothing to any of his victims and yet, he 
is entitled to file four claims with his 
own company to pay for his medical 
bills, lost wages, and economic losses. 
A decade after no-fault was imple-
mented, an independent study revealed 
that accident deaths rose by as much as 
15% in no-fault states as compared to 
traditional states.8 ! A similar empirical 
study in 1982 revealed no-fault insur-
ance in New Zealand was the cause of a 
16% increase in automobile accident 
deaths.82 A 1982 study revealed a signifi-
cant increase in fatal accidents in states 
with tort restrictions similar to no-fault, 
when compared to unrestricted states.83 
The study found that, except for states 
with very low tort thresholds, no-fault 
has produced a statistically significant 
increase in fatal accidents. For example, 
studies found a medical expense thresh-
old of $500 results in approximately a 
4 % increase in fatal accident rates, as 
opposed to a 10% increase in states with 
a $1,500 threshold.84 Although three sub-
sequent studies found no significant 
effects on fatality rates from the adop-
tion of a no-fault system, the possibility 
of deterrent efforts imposed by a tradi-
tional tort system cannot be ignored.85 
Profitability of Automobile 
Insurance Companies 
In statistical debates that have raged 
between supporters and opponents of 
the traditional tort system, insurance 
companies often point to their sizable 
underwriting losses, proclaiming emi-
nent insolvency if victims' rights are not 
restricted. The industry's financial his-
tory, however, tells a story for stronger 
regulation, not implementation of no-
fault insurance. 
Premiums are often perceived as an 
insurance company's only source of in-
come. This might be due to the fact that 
premiums are calculated to cover the 
anticipated claims. However, since 
policyholders are not immediately in-
volved in accidents, the premiums that 
they pay are invested and immediately 
become a second source of income, 
referred to as a continuing investment 
account. By accumulating interest from 
future underwriting costs, the continu-
ing investment account is sheltered. 
Investment income constitutes a sub-
stantial portion of the insurance com-
pany's profits. Underwriting loss, how-
ever, is merely an industry term that 
refers to the amount paid out in claims. 
It is not a loss in any real sense of the 
term. Underwriting profits are the 
amount realized after deducting the 
money paid out for claims from the 
premiums collected during a given 
period. Thus, underwriting profits and 
losses neglect to tell the casual observer 
the whole tale. An underwriting loss 
that was previously earning interest will 
then be utilized to reduce the insurance 
company's tax liability. 
Another interest income that often 
goes unnoticed is the reserves or the 
amount the insurance company sets 
aside to pay claims. Insurance carriers 
routinely reserve amounts for claims 
which they assume have occurred but 
have not been reported. Insurance com-
panies can "over-reserve," thereby min-
imizing profit statements and justifying 
premium increases. 
As opposed to a tax deduction, which 
is generally subtracted from gross in-
come to arrive at adjusted gross income 
or taxable income, a tax credit is sub-
tracted from the computed tax itself. In 
effect, a tax credit reduces the amount 
owed to the government in taxes. Never-
theless, an anticipated claim reduces the 
amount paid in taxes on profits. This 
creates a third source of income in the 
form of tax credits granted by the fed-
eral government. However, most claims 
are not immediately paid in full and 
many claims are never paid. 
The following chart reveals the tax 
credits received by Maryland's three 
largest auto insurance carriers: Allstate, 
State Farm, and Nationwide. In the five 
years shown, they reported a combined 
increase in surplus revenue of over $9.7 
billion nationwide and yet they received 
over $178 million in combined federal 
tax credits.86 
Maryland's second largest insurer, All-
state, paid taxes only during one of the 
five years examined.87 Allstate amassed a 
tax credit balance from 1985 to 1989 of 
more than $488 million.88 This half a 
billion dollar tax credit was enjoyed 
when the company's net worth increased 
by $847 million.89 
Using information from the A.M. Best 
Company, an insurance industry analyst 
company, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) conducted a thorough 
study on the profitability of the automo-
bile lines of the property/casualty insur-
Tax Credits in Dollars &om 1985 to 1989 
Year Allstate State Farm Nationwide 
1985 276,870,000 41,820,957 
1986 173,845,000 26,934,613 26,934,613 
1987 (132,061,313 ) (582,440,084 ) 17,222,676 
1988 30,285,370 (323,671,681 ) (5,775,077) 
1989 132,388,535 319,755,178 (29,467,344) 
Total Tax Credits 
611,000,000 346,641,928 85,978,246 
Total Taxes Paid in Those Years 
132,061,313 906,111,665 35,242,421 
Addition to Coq~oration's Net Worth During Same Time Period 
847,000,000 5,767,000,000 1,098,000,000 
(bracketed numbers represent additional taxes and therefore no tax credit.) 
ance industry from 1978 through 
1987.90 Even though A.M. Best receives 
its information exclusively from the 
insurance companies themselves,91 .the 
GAO found that for the ten year period . 
from 1978 to 1987, automobile insur-
ance lines netted an estimated after-tax 
profit of about $22.6 billion nation-
wide,92 despite underwriting losses of 
over $30 billion.93 The $22.6 billion dol-
lar profit, therefore, reflects investment 
gains of about $54 billion after taxes.94 
In 1987 alone, $78 billion in automo-
bile insurance premiums were collected, 
representing over 41 % of the premiums 
from all types of insurance. In that same 
year, losses totalled approximately $54 
billion. Dividends returned to stock-. 
holders were $1.5 billion, and the return 
on investment was at the highest level of 
the entire ten years of the study.95It does 
not take a mathematics degree to see 
that $1.5 billion in dividends and $54 
billion in losses and expenses subtracted 
from $78 billion in premiums leaves 
$22.5 billion or 29% profit. 
The insurance industry's cry of a lack 
of profitability should go unheeded. The 
foregoing statistics highlight a 29% profit 
of $22.5 billion dollars in the automo-
bile insurance industry alone. Between 
tax credits, continuing interest accounts, 
and anticipated claims coverage by cur-
rent premiums, the insurance compa-
nies are living in a very comfortable 
margin. 
Conclusion 
Proponents for no-fault argue that it 
will keep insurance premiums lower, 
decrease litigation, reduce delays in the 
payment of claims, and increase victims' 
benefits. This is simply not the case. No-
fault insurance suffers from a number of 
deficiencies. First, empirical evidence 
suggests that after an initial drop, a no-
fault environment will demand higher 
premuims. This fact and the impact of 
skyrocketing premiums on urban 
dwellers have forced states employing 
no-fault to repeal their laws. Second, 
because victims are prevented from ob-
taining compensation from a negligent 
party, they are forced to sue their own 
insurance companies. In Michigan, no-
fault resulted in a substantial increase in 
these "first party" suits. Furthermore, 
thresholds do not completely preclude 
a majority of automobile negligence 
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suits. Third, faster benefits are actually 
smaller benefits. Fourth, in a no-fault 
system, medical care is comprised of 
restricted medical fees, "cut-off" exam-
inations, or premature reviews of medi-
cal treatment. In reducing the amount of 
medical care, the industry may reduce 
its payout and increase its profits, but 
only at the expense of the injured policy-
holder. In order to be adequately com-
pensated, the victim is again forced to 
sue his or her own insurance company. 
Fifth, without fault, there simply is no 
deterrence. The threat of rising premi-
ums and loss of insurance is a motivation 
for avoiding collisions. With this 
negated, problems arise. Finally, al-
though the insurance industry talks of 
their underwriting losses, their invest-
ment accounts and tax credits tell a dif-
ferent story. 
No-fault insurance has been an inter-
esting and noteworthy experiment in a 
few states. Those states that have exper-
imented with this misaligned solution 
should be commended for their at-
tempts. However, the empirical evi-
dence they created sh<?ws that no-fault 
insurance increases premiums, fatal-
ities, and litigation while decreasing 
medical care and abating deterrence. 
Clearly, no one should be standing in the 
crossroads. 
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